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1. Introduction
As a large cohort of baby boomers approach retirement, the design of products that ensure
the lifetime ﬁnancial security of retirees is at the forefront of the agenda in the ﬁnancial
industry. In public policy, there is active debate on whether the Social Security system can
be reformed to improve the welfare of present and future retirees. Despite this interest,
little is understood about the asset-allocation decisions of retirees. Although there is a
large literature that studies life-cycle asset allocation in the working phase when households
face labor-income risk, there is relatively little work on asset allocation in retirement when
households face health risk. This paper attempts to ﬁll a gap in the life-cycle literature
with a positive (in contrast to normative) analysis of the joint demand for health care and
ﬁnancial assets in retirement.
Speciﬁcally, this paper develops a consumption and portfolio-choice model in which a re-
tiree faces exogenous and stochastic depreciation of health, which aﬀects the marginal utility
of wealth as well as life expectancy. The retiree chooses health expenditure endogenously
based on her health, wealth, and health insurance coverage. In addition, the retiree makes an
asset-allocation decision between a riskless bond, a risky asset, a real annuity, and housing.
I calibrate the model using data on health expenditure, health status, and asset holdings
for a population of retired females in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), aged 65 and
older. The model successfully explains the cross-sectional distribution as well as the joint
dynamics of health expenditure, health, and asset allocation in retirement.
This paper makes two contributions to the literature on portfolio choice in retirement.
First, this paper takes a comprehensive view of portfolio choice, which reﬂects the reality
that retirees own sophisticated portfolios allocated across four major asset classes: bonds
(including cash), risky assets (including stocks and private businesses), annuities (mostly
through deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans and Social Security), and housing. Related models of
portfolio choice in retirement focus only on a subset of these four asset classes, which is a
simpliﬁcation that is primarily useful for normative analysis (e.g., Turra and Mitchell, 2004;
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Inkmann, Lopes, and Michaelides, 2007; Love and Perozek, 2007; Pang and Warshawsky,
2007; Edwards, 2008).
The second contribution is to build a more realistic model of health risk in which health
expenditure (e.g., visiting a physical therapist) is an endogenous response to a health shock
(e.g., developing a back pain). The previous literature has taken one of two extreme posi-
tions on modeling health risk. On the one hand is a complete market in which all health risk
is insurable and uncertainty arises only over the time of death. In such a world, a retiree
without a bequest motive should fully annuitize wealth (Yaari, 1965; Friedman and War-
shawsky, 1990; Davidoﬀ, Brown, and Diamond, 2005). On the other hand is an incomplete
market in which health expenses are exogenous and stochastic, essentially modeled as nega-
tive income shocks. The inability to insure uncertainty over health expenses generates large
precautionary saving in liquid assets and crowds out the demand for annuities (Hubbard,
Skinner, and Zeldes, 1994; Palumbo, 1999; Sinclair and Smetters, 2004; De Nardi, French,
and Jones, 2006).
This paper takes a position between these two extremes, that health risk is neither fully
insurable nor entirely exogenous. A model with exogenous health expenses overstates the
degree to which markets are incomplete with respect to health risk. In reality, retirees
can endogenously adjust the quantity and quality of health care in response to changes in
their health and wealth. More debatably, retirees may be able to change the distribution
of future health (e.g., developing cancer) through endogenous investment in health (e.g.,
getting a mammogram). Overall, the endogeneity of health expenditure reduces the amount
of background risk with respect to health, which has important implications for consumption
and portfolio choice. This is analogous to the idea that the endogeneity of the labor supply
(including the timing of retirement) reduces the amount of background risk with respect to
labor income (Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson, 1992).
An important advantage of a model with endogenous health expenditure is the ability to
conduct welfare analysis, either of new ﬁnancial products or government policy. In contrast,
3
a model with exogenous health expenses is not appropriate for welfare analysis because
an alternative market structure can change the endogenous accumulation of health. In
this paper, I ask whether current retirees are suﬃciently annuitized through deﬁned-beneﬁt
pension plans and Social Security. Using the calibrated model, I conduct welfare analysis of
an annuity market that allows retirees to privately annuitize their wealth during retirement.
I ﬁnd that the welfare gain ranges from 13 percent of wealth at age 65 for those in worst
health, to 18 percent for those in best health.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a model of consump-
tion and portfolio choice in retirement. Section 3 describes the relevant measures of health
expenditure, health, and asset holdings in the HRS. Section 4 presents the main ﬁndings
of the calibrated model. Section 5 presents the welfare analysis of private annuitization.
Section 6 concludes.
2. A Model of Consumption and Portfolio Choice in
Retirement
This section describes a model of consumption and portfolio choice in retirement. The basic
structure of the model can be summarized as follows. An individual enters retirement with
an initial endowment of health and tangible wealth. Tangible wealth is the sum of the asset
value of bonds, stocks, annuities, and housing. In each period while alive, the retiree chooses
consumption, housing expenditure, health expenditure, and the asset allocation of tangible
wealth. Upon death, the retiree leaves bonds, stocks, and housing as a bequest. The asset
value of annuities, and obviously health, cannot be bequeathed.
The model has two key innovations relative to previous models of consumption and
portfolio choice in retirement. First, health is an outcome of the accumulation of past health
shocks and the endogenous choices over health care. Picone, Uribe, and Wilson (1998)
develop a related model in which the retiree can only save in a riskless bond (i.e., a model
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without housing or portfolio choice). Second, housing is the most important tangible asset
for the typical retiree, yet it has been ignored in previous analysis of portfolio choice in
retirement.1 Housing is a unique asset in that it serves a dual purpose. On the one hand,
there is consumption value from living in a home. On the other hand, housing is a store of
wealth, which the retiree can leave as a bequest or use to pay health expenses in states with
low realized health (e.g., nursing home expenses as emphasized by Davidoﬀ, 2008).
2.1 Housing Expenditure
The retiree enters each period t with an initial stock of housing Dt−1. The stock of housing
incorporates both the size and the quality of the home. Housing depreciates at a constant
rate δ ∈ (0, 1] in each period. After depreciation, the retiree chooses housing expenditure
Et, which can be negative in the case downsizing. The accumulation equation for housing is
Dt = (1− δ)Dt−1 + Et. (1)
2.2 Health Expenditure
Following Grossman (1972), I also model the retiree’s health as an accumulation process.
The retiree enters each period t with an initial stock of health Ht−1. Health depreciates
at a stochastic rate ωt ≤ 1 in each period t. The realization of ωt is exogenous, but its
distribution can depend on state variables in period t such as Ht−1. For example, whether
you get a heart attack today is purely chance, but the likelihood of getting a heart attack
depends on whether you have a history of heart disease. The retiree dies if ωt = 1, that
is, if her health depreciates entirely. The retiree’s maximum possible lifetime is T so that
ωT+1 = 1 with certainty.
After health depreciation is realized in period t, the retiree chooses health expenditure
1Cocco (2005), Hu (2005), and Yao and Zhang (2005) also develop life-cycle models with housing. How-
ever, they focus on its interaction with labor-income risk during the working phase, instead of health risk
during retirement.
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It ≥ 0 if she is still alive. Health expenditure is an investment in the sense that its eﬀects
on health can persist for more than one period. Health investment is irreversible in the
sense that the retiree cannot reduce her health through negative expenditure. Irreversibility
of investment is a key economic feature that makes health fundamentally diﬀerent from
housing and ﬁnancial assets.
The accumulation equation for health is
Ht = (1− ωt)Ht−1 + ψ[(1− ωt)Ht−1]1−ψIψt . (2)
This speciﬁcation for health production has two key features that are well suited for empirical
analysis. First, health production is homogeneous in the stock of health. Second, health
expenditure has decreasing returns to scale (Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990). As the parameter
ψ ∈ (0, 1] approaches zero, health expenditure has diminishing impact on health.
2.3 Budget Constraint
The retiree enters each period t with ﬁnancial wealth Wt. The retiree uses wealth for con-
sumption Ct, housing expenditure Et at the relative price Pt, and health expenditure It at
the relative price Qt. The retiree saves the wealth remaining after consumption in N dif-
ferent classes of ﬁnancial assets. Let An,t denote the retiree’s savings in asset n in period t.
Let Rn,t+1 denote the gross rate of return on asset n from period t to t+1. The intraperiod
budget constraint is
N∑
n=1
An,t = Wt − Ct − PtEt −QtIt. (3)
The intertemporal budget constraint is
Wt+1 =
N∑
n=1
An,tRn,t+1. (4)
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Deﬁne tangible wealth as the sum of ﬁnancial and housing wealth,
Ŵt = Wt + (1− δ)PtDt−1. (5)
Deﬁne the asset value of housing as AD,t = PtDt. Combined with the accumulation equation
for housing (1), the intraperiod budget constraint can be rewritten as
N∑
n=1
An,t + AD,t = Ŵt − Ct −QtIt. (6)
Deﬁne the gross rate of return on housing from period t to t + 1 as
RD,t+1 =
(1− δ)Pt+1
Pt
. (7)
The intertemporal budget constraint can be rewritten as
Ŵt+1 =
N∑
n=1
An,tRn,t+1 + AD,tRD,t+1. (8)
2.4 Objective Function
If the retiree survives period t, she has utility ﬂow from consumption, housing, and health.
Her utility ﬂow is a constant elasticity of substitution function over health and non-health
consumption:
U(Ct, Dt, Ht) = [(1− α)(C1−φt Dφt )1−1/ρ + αH1−1/ρt ]1/(1−1/ρ). (9)
The parameter φ ∈ (0, 1) is the utility weight on housing, and α ∈ (0, 1) is the utility weight
on health. The parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1] is the elasticity of substitution between health and
non-health consumption.
If the retiree dies in period t, she leaves behind tangible wealth as a bequest. Her utility
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ﬂow over the bequest is
G(Ŵt, Pt) = uŴt
(
φ
(1− φ)Pt
)φ
. (10)
The parameter u > 0 determines the strength of the bequest motive. This speciﬁcation is the
indirect utility function that corresponds to a Cobb-Douglas function over consumption and
housing, C1−φt D
φ
t . It captures the notion that housing and ﬁnancial wealth are not perfectly
substitutable forms of bequest (see Yao and Zhang, 2005, for a similar approach).
Let 1{ωt =1} be an indicator function that takes the value one if the retiree dies in period
t, and let 1{ωt=1} = 1 − 1{ωt =1}. Following Epstein and Zin (1991), I deﬁne the retiree’s
objective function recursively as
Jt = {(1− β)U(Ct, Dt, Ht)1−1/σ
+βEt[1{ωt+1 =1}J
1−γ
t+1 + 1{ωt+1=1}G(Wt+1, Pt+1)
1−γ](1−1/σ)/(1−γ)}1/(1−1/σ), (11)
where the terminal value is JT+1 = 0. The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount
factor. The parameter σ > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and γ > 1 is the
relative risk aversion.
If ρ < σ, health and non-health consumption are complements in the sense that the
marginal utility of non-health consumption rises in health. For example, the marginal utility
of a ﬁne meal may be low if the retiree has diabetes. If ρ > σ, health and non-health
consumption are substitutes. For example, the marginal utility of cable television may be
high if the retiree has a physical disability.
2.5 Financial Assets and Housing
I now specify the retiree’s trading universe and portfolio constraints. The trading universe
consists of a riskless bond, a risky asset, a real annuity, and housing. These four asset classes
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capture the key economic features of actual assets held by retirees, and implicitly allow for a
rich set of portfolio strategies. For example, a “variable annuity” can be synthesized through
a portfolio strategy that is short the bond, long the risky asset, and long the annuity. A
“reverse mortgage” can be synthesized through a portfolio strategy that is short the bond,
long the annuity, and long housing. This synthetic portfolio diﬀers from a true reverse
mortgage in the sense that the retiree still bears housing-price risk.
2.5.1 Riskless Bond
The ﬁrst asset is a riskless bond, which has a constant gross rate of return R1,t = R1. For the
period 1958–2008, the average real return on the one-year Treasury bond (deﬂated by the
consumer price index for all items less medical care) is 2.5 percent. Based on this estimate,
I calibrate R1 = 1.025.
To simplify the model, I have assumed away transactions costs that may arise in selling the
home (see Cocco, 2005; Hu, 2005; Yao and Zhang, 2005, for a model with transactions costs).
However, transactions costs should not have a signiﬁcant impact on optimal consumption
and portfolio choice as long as the retiree is able to borrow from home equity. I therefore
allow the retiree to short the bond in order to model a mortgage or a home equity line of
credit. The retiree can short the bond up to a fraction λ ∈ [0, 1) of the home value, so
that its portfolio constraint is A1,t ≥ −λAD,t. Sinai and Souleles (2007) ﬁnd evidence that
retirees are less able to borrow from home equity compared to younger working households.
Based on their ﬁnding, I calibrate the borrowing limit to be 20 percent of the home value.
2.5.2 Risky Asset
The second asset is a risky asset, which has a stochastic gross rate of return
R2,t = R2ν2,t, (12)
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where log ν2,t ∼ N(−σ22/2, σ22) is independently and identically distributed. For the period
1958–2008, the real return on the Center for Research in Securities Prices value-weighted
index (deﬂated by the consumer price index for all items less medical care) has a mean of
7.3 percent and a standard deviation of 17.5 percent. Based on these estimates, I calibrate
R2 = 1.065 and σ2 = 0.18. An equity premium of 4 percent, which is slightly lower than its
historical estimate, is a standard input in life-cycle models of portfolio choice (e.g., Cocco,
Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005). The retiree cannot short the risky asset, so that its portfolio
constraint is A2,t ≥ 0.
2.5.3 Real Annuity
The third asset is a real annuity, deﬁned as a claim that pays oﬀ one unit of consumption
in every period prior to death. Let pt be an actuarially fair survival probability in period t,
which is a deterministic function of gender, birth cohort, and age. Let R3 be the expected
gross rate of return on the annuity, which is also the required rate of return that allows the
insurer to break even. The price of the annuity in period t is
P3,t =
T−t−1∑
s=1
∏s
u=1 pt+u
R
s
3
. (13)
The annuity has a gross rate of return that is contingent on survival:
R3,t =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ R3/pt if ωt = 10 if ωt = 1 . (14)
To calibrate the annuity prices and returns, I use survival probabilities for females born
in the 1940 cohort from the Social Security life tables (Bell and Miller, 2005, Table 7). The
maximum possible lifetime in the life tables is age 119. Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and
Brown (1999) ﬁnd that the yield on annuities oﬀered by insurance companies is about 1 to
2 percent lower than the yield on comparable Treasury bonds, due to adverse selection and
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transaction costs. Based on their ﬁnding, I calibrate R3 = 1.015, which is 1 percent lower
than the riskless interest rate.
Almost all individuals enter retirement with implicit annuity holdings, either through
a deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plan or Social Security. Very few retirees purchase additional
annuities through private insurance markets, presumably due to various market frictions
and participation costs (see Brown, 2007, for a survey). In the benchmark model, I model
the present situation by not allowing retirees to trade annuities during retirement. More
formally, let B3,t be the annuity holdings in period t, so that savings in the annuity is
A3,t = P3,tB3,t. The individual enters retirement with an endowment B3,0 of the annuity.
For all periods t ≥ 1, the portfolio constraint for the annuity is B3,t = B3,t−1. In Section 5,
I relax this portfolio constraint and allow the retiree to purchase additional annuities.
2.5.4 Housing
I model the gross rate of return on housing as
RD,t = RDνD,t, (15)
where log νD,t ∼ N(−σ2D/2, σ2D) is independently and identically distributed. The dynamics
of the relative price of housing is then determined by equation (7), where the the initial price
level is normalized to be P1 = 1.
Using equation (7), I compute the real return on housing (deﬂated by the consumer price
index for all items less medical care) based on a housing-price index and a depreciation rate
of 1.14 percent for private residential ﬁxed assets. For the period 1976–2008, the real housing
return based on the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight price index has a mean
of 0.4 percent and a standard deviation of 3.5 percent. Based on these estimates, I calibrate
RD = 1.004 and σD = 0.035.
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2.6 Homogeneity in Tangible Wealth
In addition to age, the state variables of the consumption and portfolio-choice problem
are health, tangible wealth, annuity holdings, and the relative price of housing. However,
homogeneity of the objective function implies that tangible wealth drops out as a state
variable as shown in Appendix B. Therefore, the key state variable in the model is health
relative to tangible wealth, deﬁned as
Ĥt =
(1− ωt)QtHt−1
Ŵt
. (16)
Homogeneity is a standard assumption in life-cycle models of consumption and portfolio
choice, which substantially simpliﬁes the solution and makes the model well suited for em-
pirical analysis.
In order to preserve homogeneity, I make two other parametric assumptions. First, the
distribution of health depreciation depends on previous health only through its value relative
to tangible wealth. Speciﬁcally, health depreciation depends on age and health through the
distribution function
ωt+1 ∼ ω(t, Ĥt). (17)
In the next section, I estimate the distribution of health depreciation using the HRS.
Second, the relative price of health goods and services depends on age and health as
Qt = e
q(t−1)Q(t, Ĥt). (18)
The relative price of health goods and services consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part is the
macroeconomic growth of the relative price of health goods and services. For the period
1958–2008, the average log growth rate of the consumer price index for medical care relative
to that for all items less medical care was 1.9 percent. Based on this estimate, I calibrate
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q = 0.019. The second part accounts for the individual retiree’s health insurance coverage,
which varies with age and health. In Appendix A, I estimate the health insurance coverage
using the HRS.
3. Health and Retirement Study
3.1 Sample of Retirees
The HRS is a panel survey designed to study the health and wealth dynamics of the elderly
in the United States. I use the RAND HRS data ﬁle (Version I), which is produced by the
RAND Center for the Study of Aging with funding from the National Institute on Aging
and the Social Security Administration. I use the ﬁrst eight waves of the HRS, which cover
the years 1992 through 2006. I focus on those born 1891–1940, which includes the Study
of Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (born before 1924), the Children of
Depression (born 1924–1930), and the initial HRS cohort (born 1931–1941).
My analysis focuses on the sample of retired females, who are single (including separated,
divorced, and widowed) and aged 65 and older at the time of interview. The choice of single
individuals is dictated by the fact that married households maximize a more complicated
objective function that depends on the health and survival of both partners. The choice
of females is motivated by the fact that their life expectancy is longer than that of males,
which increases the importance of annuities in the retirement portfolio. Because retirees are
interviewed every two years, I code age in groups of two years from the 65–66 age group
to the 117–118 age group. All empirical analysis uses the person-level analysis weight, so
that the sample is representative of the United States population in the Current Population
Survey.
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3.2 Health Status and Health Care Utilization
Retirees in the HRS report various measures of health every two years. The primary measure
of health for my study is the self-reported general health status. The respondent can report
that her health is either poor, fair, good, very good, or excellent. Insofar as health enters
the retiree’s utility function, self-reported health status is a relevant measure of health for
an empirical implementation of the model. As shown below, self-reported health status is a
signiﬁcant predictor of future mortality.
Panel A of Table 1 reports the percentage of retirees who have ever reported doctor-
diagnosed health problems, separately by health status. The panel shows that self-reported
health status is highly correlated with objective measures of physical and mental health (also
see Wallace and Herzog, 1995). For example, 30 percent of those who report to be in poor
health have had diabetes. The corresponding numbers are 24 percent of those in fair health,
15 percent of those in good health, 9 percent of those in very good health, and only 5 percent
of those in excellent health. As another example, 56 percent of those who report to be in
poor health have had heart problems. The corresponding numbers are 41 percent of those
in fair health, 28 percent of those in good health, 18 percent of those in very good health,
and only 12 percent of those in excellent health.
Panel B reports the percentage of retirees who report some diﬃculty with activities of
daily living at the time of interview, separately by health status. The panel shows that
self-reported health status is highly correlated with measures of functional limitation. For
example, 46 percent of those who report to be in poor health have some diﬃculty with
dressing. The corresponding numbers are 24 percent of those in fair health, 12 percent of
those in good health, 6 percent of those in very good health, and only 4 percent of those in
excellent health.
Panel C reports the percentage of retirees who report utilizing health care in the two
years prior to the interview, separately by health status. The panel shows that self-reported
health status is negatively correlated with measures of health care utilization. For example,
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97 percent of those who report to be in poor health have visited a doctor in the two years
prior to the interview. The corresponding numbers are 97 percent of those in fair health, 95
percent of those in good health, 93 percent of those in very good health, and only 88 percent
of those in excellent health.
In addition to health care, Panel C reports two other measures of health investment
broadly deﬁned, vigorous physical activity and smoking. Only 7 percent of those who report
to be in poor health participate in vigorous physical activity at least three times a week. The
corresponding numbers are 14 percent of those in fair health, 25 percent of those in good
health, 34 percent of those in very good health, and only 46 percent of those in excellent
health.
3.3 Health Transition Probabilities
The health accumulation equation (2) determines the transition dynamics of health and is
therefore a key input in the model. In this section, I estimate its empirical analog using data
on self-reported status and an ordered probit model (see Wagstaﬀ, 1986; Khwaja, 2002, for
a similar approach).
In each period t, the retiree reports her health status H∗t . The health status depends on
a latent variable Ht, which captures unobservable health, through the response function
H∗t =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 Dead if Ht < HP
1 Poor if HP ≤ Ht < HF
2 Fair if HF ≤ Ht < HG
3 Good if HG ≤ Ht < HV G
4 Very Good if HV G ≤ Ht < HE
5 Excellent if HE ≤ Ht
. (19)
I model future health Ht+1 as a function of explanatory variables in period t, which in-
clude cohort dummies, present health status, age, tangible wealth, and their interaction
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with present health status. Additional explanatory variables are measures of health care
utilization, which include dummies for a doctor visit, a dentist visit, home health care, nurs-
ing home, outpatient surgery, prescription drugs, a cholesterol test, a mammogram, vigorous
physical activity, and smoking. I interact these measures of health care utilization with
health status to allow for the possibility that the marginal product of health care varies
across health.
Column (1) of Table 2 reports the estimated coeﬃcients for the benchmark speciﬁcation.
The sign of the coeﬃcients can be interpreted as the direction of the marginal eﬀects for
the extreme health outcomes, death and excellent health (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 506). The
coeﬃcients for health status show that present health is a signiﬁcant predictor of future
health. The coeﬃcients are negative for poor and fair health, and positive for very good
and excellent health. This means that relative to those in good health, which is the omitted
category, those who are presently in poor or fair health are more likely to die in the next
period. The coeﬃcient for age is negative, which implies that health deteriorates as retirees
age. The coeﬃcient for tangible wealth is positive, which implies that wealthier retirees are
less likely to die holding everything else constant.
Of the explanatory variables that measure health care utilization, those that are signiﬁ-
cant predictors of future health are a dentist visit, vigorous physical activity, and smoking.
Those that are insigniﬁcant predictors of future health are a doctor visit, nursing home, out-
patient surgery, a cholesterol test, and a mammogram. Home health care and prescription
drugs predict future health with a negative sign, so the null hypothesis that these goods and
services improve future health is rejected. A joint Wald test on these measures of health
care utilization rejects with a p-value of 0 percent, suggesting that taken together, health
care utilization is a signiﬁcant predictor of future health.
A potential problem with this benchmark speciﬁcation is unobservable heterogeneity in
health that is not fully captured by present health status. Insofar as health care utilization
is negatively correlated with unobserved heterogeneity in health (i.e., those that are already
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sick are more likely to utilize health care), the coeﬃcients for health care utilization are
likely to be downward biased. In order to explore this possibility, column (2) of Table 2
estimates an alternative speciﬁcation that includes dummies for doctor-diagnosed health
problems and measures of some diﬃculty with activities of daily living. These additional
measures of health enter signiﬁcantly, capturing heterogeneity in health that is not fully
captured by self-reported health status. Controlling for these additional measures of health,
the coeﬃcients for health care utilization become more positive, conﬁrming the hypothesis
that they were downward biased in the benchmark speciﬁcation.
I use the estimated ordered probit model to predict the health transition probabilities
in the absence of health expenditure (i.e., shutting oﬀ all dummies related to health care
utilization). Figure 1 shows the predicted transition probabilities by health and age for
retired females, born 1931–1940 and at the average tangible wealth conditional on cohort
and age. The ﬁgure clearly illustrates that present health is a signiﬁcant predictor of future
mortality. Conditional on being in poor health at any given age, death is the most likely
outcome in the next period. Conditional on being in excellent health at any given age, death
is the least likely outcome in the next period. These predicted health transition probabilities
correspond to the distribution of health depreciation in equation (17), which I use to calibrate
the model in Section 4.
3.4 Asset Allocation
Retirees in the HRS report holdings of four major asset classes: bonds, risky assets, annuities,
and housing (see Appendix A for deﬁnitions). For each asset class, I compute its portfolio
share as a ratio to tangible wealth, which is the sum of the value of all four asset classes.
I use a censored regression model to estimate how the portfolio share in each asset class
depends on cohort dummies, health status, age, tangible wealth, and their interaction with
health status. Table 3 reports the estimated regression models for annuities, risky assets,
and housing. (I omit bonds because the portfolio shares must add up to one.) Hurd (2002)
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and Coile and Milligan (2006) also document asset allocation in the HRS. However, they
ignore the asset value of annuities in their analysis, which is important from the perspective
of the life-cycle model.
The portfolio share in risky assets rises in health, holding constant tangible wealth (also
see Rosen and Wu, 2004). Relative to those in good health, which is the omitted category,
those in poor health have 1.40 percentage points less in risky assets. Relative to those in
good health, those in excellent health have 0.67 percentage points more in risky assets. The
portfolio share in risky assets also rises in age, which partly arises from the fact that the
portfolio share in annuities falls in age. For those in good health, the portfolio share falls
by 1.32 percentage points for each ten years of age. The portfolio share in risky assets also
rises in the logarithm of tangible wealth. For those in good health, the portfolio share rises
by 6.32 percentage points when tangible wealth rises by 100 percent.
The portfolio share in annuities falls in health, holding constant tangible wealth. Relative
to those in good health, those in poor health have 1.66 percentage points more in annuities.
Relative to those in good health, those in excellent health have 5.68 percentage points less
in annuities. The portfolio share in annuities also falls in age, which is a direct consequence
of the fact that the present value of future annuity income falls in age. For those in good
health, the portfolio share falls by 11.70 percentage points for each ten years of age. The
portfolio share in annuities also falls in the logarithm of tangible wealth. For those in good
health, the portfolio share falls by 23.36 percentage points when tangible wealth rises by 100
percent.
In addition to being part of wealth, housing is the only measure of non-health consump-
tion that is available in the HRS. The portfolio share in housing does not vary in health,
holding constant tangible wealth. This suggests that housing and health are neither strong
complements nor substitutes in the utility function, leading to the parameterization ρ = σ
for the model. The portfolio share in housing falls in age, which partly arises from the fact
that the portfolio share in annuities falls in age. For those in good health, the portfolio share
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rises by 1.70 percentage points for each ten years of age. The portfolio share in housing rises
in the logarithm of tangible wealth. For those in good health, the portfolio share rises by
12.00 percentage points when tangible wealth rises by 100 percent.
4. Health Expenditure and Asset Allocation in the Bench-
mark Model
As described in Appendix B, I solve the consumption and portfolio-choice model by dynamic
programming. Using the optimal consumption and portfolio policies, I simulate a population
of 100,000 retirees every two years (to coincide with the frequency of interviews in the HRS)
from age 65–66 until death. The initial distribution of health is drawn from a lognormal
distribution (i.e., log Ĥ1 ∼ N(μH, σH)) to match the distribution of health for retirees in the
HRS at age 65–66. In addition, the initial value of annuities is chosen to match the portfolio
share in annuities, conditional on health status, for retirees in the HRS at age 65–66.
Table 4 summarizes the parameters used to calibrate the benchmark model. Following
a standard practice for life-cycle models, I calibrate the subjective discount factor to be
β = 0.96. As discussed below, I calibrate the remaining preference parameters to match the
targeted moments in the HRS. Overall, the model does a remarkable job of explaining the
cross-sectional distribution as well as the joint dynamics of health and wealth in the HRS.
4.1 Health Expenditure
To facilitate the comparison of the data and the model, Panel A of Table 5 reports out-
of-pocket health expenditure as a percentage of income by health and age for retirees in
the HRS. The table reports the ﬁve categories of health status and six age groups: 65–66,
71–72, 77–78, 83–84, and 89–90. The table does not extend beyond age 90 because attrition
through death in both the data and the model makes the comparison potentially unreliable.
Health expenditure falls in health and rises in age. At age 65–66, those in poor health
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spend 16 percent of their income on health care, compared to 5 percent for those in excellent
health. Retirees in good health spend 8 percent of their income on health care at age 65–66,
compared to 25 percent at age 89–90.
Panel B reports health expenditure as a percentage of income by health and age for sim-
ulated retirees in the benchmark model. I use the parameter α, which is the utility weight
on health, to match the level of health expenditure. I use the parameter σ, which is the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, to match the variation in health expenditure with
age. Finally, I use the parameter ψ, which is the returns to scale on health investment, to
match the cross-sectional variation in health expenditure across health. The model success-
fully matches the overall pattern in the data, that health expenditure falls in health and
rises in age. At age 65–66, those in poor health spend 21 percent of their income on health
care, compared to 6 percent for those in excellent health. Retirees in good health spend 12
percent of their income on health care at age 65–66, compared to 19 percent at age 89–90.
4.2 Distribution of Health
Panel A of Table 6 reports the cross-sectional distribution of health by age for retirees in the
HRS. The distribution of health at age 65–66 is 10 percent in poor, 24 percent in fair, 33
percent in good, 25 percent in very good, and 8 percent in excellent. Health subsequently
deteriorates over retirement. The distribution of health at age 89–90 is 14 percent in poor,
27 percent in fair, 33 percent in good, 21 percent in very good, and 5 percent in excellent.
Panel B reports the cross-sectional distribution of health by age for simulated retirees in
the benchmark model. I calibrate the initial endowment of health to match the distribution
of health at age 65–66. I use the parameters μH and σH , the mean and the standard
deviation of health, to control the dynamics of health over retirement. The model predicts
high accumulation of health early in retirement, implying that health investment is initially
too productive. However, health subsequently deteriorates over retirement, and the model
matches the distribution of health by age 89–90. The distribution of health at age 89–90 is
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11 percent in poor, 23 percent in fair, 36 percent in good, 26 percent in very good, and 5
percent in excellent.
4.3 Asset Allocation
4.3.1 Portfolio Share in Bonds
Panel A of Table 7 reports the portfolio share in bonds by health and age for retirees in
the HRS. The tabulation uses predicted values from the regression model in Table 3. The
portfolio share in bonds is mostly level in health but rises in age. Retirees in good health
have 3 percent of their tangible wealth in bonds at age 65–66, compared to 22 percent at
age 89–90. Retirees allocate a surprisingly large share of their wealth to liquid assets late in
retirement.
Panel B reports the portfolio share in bonds by health and age for simulated retirees in
the benchmark model. I use the parameter u, which is the strength of the bequest motive,
to match the level of the portfolio share in bonds at age 91–92. That a bequest motive is
necessary to explain liquid asset holdings, even in a model with uninsurable health risk, is
consistent with previous ﬁndings (Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2007;
Love, Palumbo, and Smith, 2009). The model successfully matches how the portfolio share
in bonds rises in age. Retirees in good health have 4 percent of their tangible wealth in
bonds at age 65–66, compared to 20 percent at age 89–90.
4.3.2 Portfolio Share in Risky Assets
Panel A of Table 8 reports the portfolio share in risky assets by health and age for retirees
in the HRS. The portfolio share in risky assets rises slightly in both health and age. At age
65–66, those in poor health have 3 percent of their tangible wealth in risky assets, compared
to 5 percent for those in excellent health. Retirees in good health have 4 percent of their
tangible wealth in risky assets at age 65–66, compared to 9 percent at age 89–90.
Panel B of Table 8 reports the portfolio share in risky assets by health and age for
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simulated retirees in the benchmark model. I use the parameter γ, which is the relative risk
aversion, to match the level of the portfolio share in risky assets. The model successfully
matches how the portfolio share in risky assets rises slightly in both health and age. At age
65–66, those in poor health have 3 percent of their tangible wealth in risky assets, compared
to 7 percent for those in excellent health. Retirees in good health have 6 percent of their
tangible wealth in risky assets at age 65–66, compared to 10 percent at age 89–90.
4.3.3 Portfolio Share in Annuities
Panel A of Table 9 reports the portfolio share in annuities by health and age for retirees
in the HRS. The portfolio share in annuities falls slightly in health and falls signiﬁcantly in
age. At age 65–66, those in poor health have 73 percent of their tangible wealth in annuities,
compared to 66 percent for those in excellent health. Retirees in good health have 71 percent
of their tangible wealth in annuities at age 65–66, compared to 43 percent at age 89–90.
Panel B reports the portfolio share in annuities by health and age for simulated retirees in
the benchmark model. I calibrate the initial endowment of annuities to match the portfolio
share in annuities at age 65–66. The model successfully matches how the portfolio share in
annuities falls in age. Retirees in good health have 71 percent of their tangible wealth in
annuities at age 65–66, compared to 42 percent at age 89–90.
4.3.4 Portfolio Share in Housing
Panel A of Table 10 reports the portfolio share in housing by health and age for retirees in
the HRS. The portfolio share in housing is mostly level in health but rises in age. Retirees
in good health have 22 percent of their tangible wealth in housing at age 65–66, compared
to 26 percent at age 89–90. Housing remains a signiﬁcant share of the portfolio, even late
in retirement. Venti and Wise (2004) ﬁnd that retirees are unlikely to discontinue home
ownership, and on average, increase their home equity when they move. Based on this
evidence, Venti and Wise conclude that the large home equity in the retirement portfolio is
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not a consequence of transactions costs that prevent retirees from downsizing their homes.
Panel B reports the portfolio share in housing by health and age for simulated retirees
in the benchmark model. I use the parameter φ, which is the utility weight on housing,
to match the level of the portfolio share in housing. I use the parameter ρ, which is the
elasticity of substitution between health and non-health consumption, to match the cross-
sectional variation in the portfolio share in housing across health. The model successfully
matches how the portfolio share in housing rises in age. Retirees in good health have 20
percent of their tangible wealth in housing at age 65–66, compared to 28 percent at age
89–90.
5. Welfare Analysis of Private Annuitization
In the benchmark model, the retiree holds a constant endowment of the annuity throughout
retirement, as part of a deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plan or Social Security. I now relax this
constraint and allow the retiree to purchase additional annuities in any period during retire-
ment. In modeling an annuity market, I adopt two important institutional features of the
private annuity market in the United States. First, the pricing of annuities is contingent on
age but not on health, calibrated to private insurance rates (Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky,
and Brown, 1999). Second, annuities are illiquid in the sense that the retiree cannot sell
them back to the insurer (due to the potential for adverse selection). In the model, this
amounts to a portfolio constraint B3,t ≥ B3,t−1 for the annuity in each period t.
Table 11 shows the health expenditure and the asset allocation of simulated retirees in
the model with an annuity market. Health expenditure is expressed as a percentage of
income coming from the initial endowment of annuities at age 65, so that the units are
comparable to those in the benchmark model. The presence of an annuity market causes a
large reallocation from bonds and stocks to annuities. In addition, the retiree reduces her
health expenditure on average, which has an intuitive interpretation as a reduction of saving
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in health. These results suggest that much of the liquid asset holdings in the benchmark
model are a consequence of longevity risk, rather than precautionary saving arising from
uncertainty over health expenses.
I calculate the welfare gain from private annuitization by comparing the value function
in the model with an annuity market with that in the benchmark model (Brown, 2001).
The welfare gain, as a percentage of tangible wealth at age 65, is 13.4 percent for those in
poor health, 13.8 percent for those in fair health, 14.8 percent for those in good health, 15.8
percent for those in very good health, and 18.0 percent for those in excellent health. The fact
that the welfare gain rises in health is consistent with survey evidence that healthier retirees
prefer the annuity income of Social Security to an actuarially equivalent lump-sum pay-
ment (Brown, Casey, and Mitchell, 2008). To put these numbers into perspective, Mitchell,
Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999) ﬁnd a welfare gain of about 40 percent in a model
without health expenses or a bequest motive. In other words, health expenses and a bequest
motive can partly, but not entirely, explain the so-called annuity puzzle.
6. Conclusion
The study of consumption and portfolio choice in retirement is ultimately about the degree
to which markets are incomplete with respect to health risk. This paper investigates the
possibility that markets may be more complete than previous studies may have assumed
because health expenditure responds endogenously to changes in health and wealth. Indeed,
evidence from the HRS reveals that health expenditure as a percentage of income falls
signiﬁcantly in health, controlling for wealth. Moreover, measures of health care utilization
are signiﬁcant predictors of future health and mortality. To quantify the importance of these
eﬀects, I calibrate a consumption and portfolio-choice model in which health expenditure is
an endogenous response to stochastic depreciation of health. I use the model to explain the
cross-sectional distribution and the joint dynamics of health expenditure, health, and asset
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allocation for retired females in the HRS, aged 65 and older.
In a policy experiment, I use the calibrated model to assess the welfare gain from private
annuitization, beyond the forced annuitization through deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans and
Social Security. The welfare gain ranges from 13 percent of wealth at age 65 for those in
worst health, to 18 percent for those in best health. Put diﬀerently, the market frictions
and participation costs that would prevent private annuitization must be as large as these
welfare gains. Importantly, the presence of an annuity market not only reduces saving in
liquid assets, but also reduces saving in one’s own health through health expenditure. In
other words, the same frictions that prevent private annuitization appear to be linked to the
high demand for health care.
There are several issues that I have not examined, which are worth addressing in future
work. First, the model can be used to assess the welfare implications of other ﬁnancial
products, such as variable annuities and reverse mortgages (e.g., Horneﬀ, Maurer, Mitchell,
and Stamos, 2007). Second, the model can be extended to married households, in which
consumption and portfolio choice depend on the health and survival of both partners (e.g.,
Lillard and Weiss, 1997; Jacobson, 2000; Love, 2008). Finally, the horizon can be extended to
include the working phase prior to retirement. A number of interesting issues then arise such
as the correlation between health and labor-income risk (e.g., Grossman, 1972; Hugonnier,
Pelgrin, and St-Amour, 2009) and the optimal timing of retirement (e.g., Farhi and Panageas,
2007; Chai, Horneﬀ, Maurer, and Mitchell, 2009). Both health and access to health insurance
can aﬀect the timing of retirement, and consequently, consumption and portfolio decisions
(e.g., French and Jones, 2007; Blau and Gilleskie, 2008).
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Appendix A. Health and Retirement Study
A.1 Relative Price of Health Goods and Services
The RAND HRS data ﬁle contains a measure of total health expenditure on hospitals, nursing
homes, doctor visits, dentist visits, outpatient surgery, prescription drugs, home health care,
and special facilities. It also contains a measure of the out-of-pocket health expenditure,
that is, the part of total health expenditure paid by the retiree. Almost all retirees (over 99
percent) report health insurance coverage through Medicare, Medicaid, or insurance from a
previous employer. For each retiree, I compute the out-of-pocket expenditure share as the
ratio of out-of-pocket health expenditure to total health expenditure.
I use a censored regression model to estimate how the out-of-pocket expenditure share
depends on cohort dummies, health status, age, tangible wealth, and their interaction with
health status. Table 12 reports the estimated elasticities of the censored regression model.
The out-of-pocket expenditure share rises in health, holding constant tangible wealth. Rel-
ative to those in good health, which is the omitted category, those in poor health pay 10.59
percentage points less out-of-pocket. Relative to those in good health, those in fair health
pay 3.71 percentage points less out-of-pocket. This relation suggests that insurance sub-
sidizes more heavily those health goods and services that treat the unhealthy, relative to
those that maintain the health of the already healthy. The out-of-pocket expenditure share
also rises in age. For those in good health, the out-of-pocket expenditure share rises by 6.10
percentage points for each ten years of age.
I use the estimated censored regression model to predict the out-of-pocket expenditure
share by age and health status. The predicted out-of-pocket expenditure shares correspond
to Q(t, Ĥt) in equation (18), which I use to calibrate the model in Section 4.
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A.2 Definition of Asset Classes
Bonds consist of checking, savings, and money market accounts; CD, government savings
bonds, and T-bills; bonds and bond funds; and the safe part of IRA and Keogh accounts.
Following Hurd (2002), I assume that half of the value of IRA and Keogh accounts is safe
and that the other half is risky. I subtract the value of liabilities from the value of bonds.
Liabilities consist all mortgages for primary and secondary residence; other home loans for
primary residence; and other debt. Risky assets consist of businesses; stocks, mutual funds,
and investment trusts; and the risky part of IRA and Keogh accounts. Housing consists of
primary and secondary residence.
Annuities consist of an employer pension or annuity; Social Security disability and sup-
plemental security income; and Social Security retirement income. The asset value of annuity
income is calculated as total annuity income times the price of a real annuity, given by equa-
tion (13). This calculation uses survival probabilities for females in the Social Security life
tables (Bell and Miller, 2005, Table 7), matched to individuals in the HRS by birth cohort,
and a real interest rate of 1.5 percent. For simplicity, this calculation assumes away any
inﬂation and counterparty risk of annuity income (see Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick, and
Steinmeier, 1997, for a similar calculation).
Appendix B. Solution of the Consumption and Portfolio-
Choice Model
B.1 Normalizing the Model by Tangible Wealth
Because the consumption and portfolio-choice model is homogeneous, I can normalize all
variables by tangible wealth to eliminate a state variable. I normalize the policy variables
as Ĉt = Ct/Ŵt, Ît = QtIt/Ŵt, and Ân,t = An,t/Ŵt for each asset n = 1, . . . , N,D.
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The intraperiod budget constraint (6) can be normalized as
N∑
n=1
Ân,t + ÂD,t = 1− Ĉt − Ît. (B1)
The intertemporal budget constraint (8) can be normalized as
Rt+1 =
Ŵt+1
Ŵt
=
N∑
n=1
Ân,tRn,t+1 + ÂD,tRD,t+1. (B2)
Combining these two budget constraints, I eliminate Â1,t as a policy variable:
Rt+1 = (1− Ĉt − Ît)R1,t+1 +
N∑
n=2
Ân,t(Rn,t+1 − R1,t+1) + ÂD,t(RD,t+1 −R1,t+1). (B3)
In addition to age, there are three state variables in the consumption and portfolio-choice
problem. The ﬁrst state variable is health relative to tangible wealth, deﬁned in equation
(16). The law of motion for health is
Ĥt+1 =
(1− ωt+1)Qt+1Ĥt
QtRt+1
⎡⎣1 + ψ( Ît
Ĥt
)ψ⎤⎦ . (B4)
The second state variable is the value of annuities relative to tangible wealth, deﬁned as
B̂3,t =
P3,tB3,t−1
Ŵt
. (B5)
The law of motion for the value of annuities is
B̂3,t+1 =
P3,t+1Â3,t
P3,tRt+1
. (B6)
The third state variable is the relative price of housing, whose law of motion is given by
equation (7).
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The intraperiod utility ﬂow (9) can be normalized as
Ût =
U(Ct, Dt, Ht)
Ŵt
= ĈtVt, (B7)
where
Vt =
⎡⎣(1− α)( ÂD,t
PtĈt
)φ(1−1/ρ)
+ α
(
Ĥt[1 + ψ(Ît/Ĥt)
ψ]
QtĈt
)1−1/ρ⎤⎦1/(1−1/ρ) . (B8)
The bequest function can be normalized as
Ĝt =
G(Wt, Pt)
Ŵt
= u
(
φ
(1− φ)Pt
)φ
. (B9)
The marginal utility of consumption is
∂Ût
∂Ĉt
= (1− α)(1− φ)V 1/ρt
(
ÂD,t
PtĈt
)φ(1−1/ρ)
. (B10)
The marginal utility of health expenditure is
∂Ût
∂Ît
=
αψ2ĈtV
1/ρ
t
Ĥψt Î
1−ψ
t + ψÎt
(
Ĥt[1 + ψ(Ît/Ĥt)
ψ]
QtĈt
)1−1/ρ
. (B11)
The marginal utility of the portfolio share in housing is
∂Ût
∂ÂD,t
=
(1− α)φĈtV 1/ρt
ÂD,t
(
ÂD,t
PtĈt
)φ(1−1/ρ)
. (B12)
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B.2 Dynamic Programming Problem
The Bellman equation is
Ĵt =
Jt
Ŵt
= max
Ĉt,Ît,Â2,t,...,ÂN,t,ÂD,t
{(1− β)Û1−1/σt
+βEt[R
1−γ
t+1 (1{ωt+1 =1}Ĵ
1−γ
t+1 + 1{ωt+1=1}Ĝ
1−γ
t+1 )]
(1−1/σ)/(1−γ)}1/(1−1/σ). (B13)
The consumption and portfolio-choice problem is subject to the following constraints:
Ĉt + Ît + Â2,t + Â3,t + (1− λ)ÂD,t ≤ 1, (B14)
Â3,t ≥ B̂3,t. (B15)
In the benchmark model without private annuitization, constraint (B15) holds as an equality.
The partial derivative of the value function with respect to consumption is
∂Ĵt
∂Ĉt
= Ĵ
1/σ
t
{
(1− β)Û−1/σt
∂Ût
∂Ĉt
−βEt[R1−γt+1 (1{ωt+1 =1}Ĵ1−γt+1 + 1{ωt+1=1}Ĝ1−γt+1 )](γ−1/σ)/(1−γ)
×Et[R−γt+1R1,t+1(1{ωt+1 =1}Ĵt+1 + 1{ωt+1=1}Ĝ1−γt+1 )]}. (B16)
The partial derivative of the value function with respect to health expenditure is
∂Ĵt
∂Ît
= Ĵ
1/σ
t
{
(1− β)Û−1/σt
∂Ût
∂Ît
−βEt[R1−γt+1 (1{ωt+1 =1}Ĵ1−γt+1 + 1{ωt+1=1}Ĝ1−γt+1 )](γ−1/σ)/(1−γ)
×Et[R−γt+1R1,t+1(1{ωt+1 =1}Ĵt+1 + 1{ωt+1=1}Ĝ1−γt+1 )]}. (B17)
The partial derivative of the value function with respect to the portfolio share in each ﬁnancial
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asset is
∂Ĵt
∂Ân,t
= Ĵ
1/σ
t βEt[R
1−γ
t+1 (1{ωt+1 =1}Ĵ
1−γ
t+1 + 1{ωt+1=1}Ĝ
1−γ
t+1 )]
(γ−1/σ)/(1−γ)
×Et[R−γt+1(Rn,t+1 −R1,t+1)(1{ωt+1 =1}Ĵt+1 + 1{ωt+1=1}Ĝ1−γt+1 )], (B18)
for n = 2, . . . , N . The partial derivative of the value function with respect to the portfolio
share in housing is
∂Ĵt
∂ÂD,t
= Ĵ
1/σ
t
{
(1− β)Û−1/σt
∂Ût
∂ÂD,t
+βEt[R
1−γ
t+1 (1{ωt+1 =1}Ĵ
1−γ
t+1 + 1{ωt+1=1}Ĝ
1−γ
t+1 )]
(γ−1/σ)/(1−γ)
×Et[R−γt+1(RD,t+1 −R1,t+1)(1{ωt+1 =1}Ĵt+1 + 1{ωt+1=1}Ĝ1−γt+1 )]}. (B19)
B.3 Numerical Algorithm
Retirees are assumed to die with certainty at age 119–120. I use value iteration to solve the
dynamic programming problem recursively from age 117–118 back to age 65–66. I discretize
health Ĥt into ﬁve grid points, where the grid values are based on the initial distribution
of health at age 65–66. I discretize the value of annuities B̂3,t into ﬁve grid points, equally
spaced from 0.1 to 0.9. I discretize the relative price of housing Pt into ﬁve grid points,
equally spaced on a logarithmic scale from 1 to 1.5. I compute the transition probabilities
between these ﬁve grid points based on the moments for housing return (15). Finally, I
discretize the lognormal shock to risky assets ν2,t into ﬁve grid points, spaced so that each
grid value realizes with equal probability.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Health Status and Health Care Utilization
Panel A reports the percentage of retirees who have ever reported doctor-diagnosed health
problems, separately by health status. Panel B reports the percentage of retirees who report
some diﬃculty with activities of daily living at the time of interview, separately by health
status. Panel C reports the percentage of retirees who report utilizing health care in the
two years prior to the interview, separately by health status. The sample consists of retired
females in the HRS, born 1891–1940 and aged 65 and older.
Health Status
Poor Fair Good Very Good Excellent
Panel A: Doctor-Diagnosed Health Problems (% of Retirees)
High blood pressure 72 67 61 50 34
Diabetes 30 24 15 9 5
Cancer 19 16 14 13 9
Lung disease 21 14 8 5 3
Heart problems 56 41 28 18 12
Stroke 29 17 11 7 4
Psychiatric problems 31 21 13 9 5
Arthritis 81 74 65 55 38
Panel B: Some Diﬃculty with Activities of Daily Living (% of Retirees)
Bathing 48 24 12 7 5
Dressing 46 24 12 6 4
Eating 24 10 4 3 2
Panel C: Health Care Utilization (% of Retirees)
Doctor visit 97 97 95 93 88
Dentist visit 33 41 50 57 59
Home health care 35 20 12 7 5
Nursing home 23 12 8 6 5
Outpatient surgery 19 19 18 17 16
Prescription drugs 95 93 87 80 65
Cholesterol test 78 77 77 78 70
Mammogram 53 59 62 63 60
Vigorous physical activity 7 14 25 34 46
Smoking 10 11 10 9 8
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Table 2: Estimation of the Health Transition Probabilities
The table reports estimates of an ordered probit model for predicting future health status (at two years
from the present interview). The latent variable, which captures unobservable health, depends on cohort
dummies, present health status, age, tangible wealth, and their interaction with health status. Additional
explanatory variables include dummies for measures of health care utilization (a doctor visit, a dentist visit,
home health care, nursing home, outpatient surgery, prescription drugs, a cholesterol test, a mammogram,
vigorous physical activity, and smoking), dummies for doctor-diagnosed health problems, and dummies for
measures of some diﬃculty with activities of daily living. The table reports the estimated coeﬃcients with
heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses. The sample consists of retired females in the HRS, born
1891–1940 and aged 65 and older.
Explanatory Variable (1) (2)
Birth cohort:
1891–1900 -67.44 (-3.36) -80.35 (-3.99)
1901–1910 -26.26 (-3.24) -36.18 (-4.38)
1911–1920 -4.98 (-1.02) -13.41 (-2.68)
1921–1930 0.20 (0.06) -4.81 (-1.48)
Health status:
Poor -150.39 (-5.40) -120.26 (-4.31)
Fair -87.35 (-5.34) -77.28 (-4.58)
Very good 40.09 (2.74) 36.16 (2.42)
Excellent 118.38 (5.30) 110.93 (4.94)
(Age− 65)/10 -18.11 (-5.04) -13.42 (-3.68)
× Poor 14.42 (3.42) 11.19 (2.62)
× Fair 15.03 (4.11) 13.75 (3.71)
× Very good 0.36 (0.09) 1.79 (0.43)
× Excellent 2.19 (0.29) 4.77 (0.63)
Tangible wealth 7.00 (3.24) 5.77 (2.63)
× Poor -10.73 (-3.03) -9.74 (-2.72)
× Fair -7.35 (-2.42) -6.97 (-2.27)
× Very good 5.44 (1.52) 5.53 (1.54)
× Excellent 5.63 (0.97) 5.42 (0.93)
Doctor visit -1.63 (-0.15) -0.88 (-0.08)
× Poor -2.73 (-0.12) -10.78 (-0.48)
× Fair 2.06 (0.13) 2.75 (0.16)
× Very good 3.14 (0.21) 2.76 (0.19)
× Excellent -14.95 (-0.68) -12.44 (-0.56)
Dentist visit 9.15 (2.55) 6.57 (1.82)
× Poor 2.47 (0.38) 2.38 (0.36)
× Fair 1.27 (0.24) 2.05 (0.39)
× Very good 11.24 (1.90) 11.48 (1.94)
× Excellent 13.31 (1.11) 12.73 (1.06)
Home health care -29.92 (-4.88) -19.44 (-3.13)
× Poor 3.97 (0.49) 7.88 (0.95)
× Fair 1.48 (0.19) 5.12 (0.65)
× Very good -13.60 (-1.09) -15.33 (-1.22)
× Excellent -92.41 (-3.21) -86.65 (-3.10)
Nursing home 1.54 (0.15) 0.69 (0.07)
× Poor -16.11 (-1.18) -9.03 (-0.66)
× Fair -30.40 (-2.16) -21.95 (-1.55)
× Very good -24.87 (-1.25) -17.43 (-0.87)
× Excellent -86.20 (-1.60) -84.47 (-1.54)
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Explanatory Variable (1) (2)
Outpatient surgery 0.00 (0.00) 1.52 (0.35)
× Poor 2.74 (0.38) 1.58 (0.21)
× Fair 0.18 (0.03) -0.35 (-0.06)
× Very good -1.83 (-0.26) -1.78 (-0.25)
× Excellent -0.84 (-0.06) -0.13 (-0.01)
Prescription drugs -20.77 (-3.92) -3.70 (-0.68)
× Poor 20.06 (1.36) 26.10 (1.74)
× Fair -3.17 (-0.32) -2.61 (-0.27)
× Very good -1.53 (-0.19) -5.11 (-0.64)
× Excellent -12.65 (-0.99) -22.64 (-1.78)
Cholesterol test 4.25 (0.96) 8.25 (1.86)
× Poor -3.71 (-0.48) -6.12 (-0.80)
× Fair 5.69 (0.87) 4.25 (0.65)
× Very good 15.00 (2.01) 13.09 (1.74)
× Excellent -13.19 (-0.95) -14.09 (-1.02)
Mammogram 2.61 (0.66) 3.21 (0.81)
× Poor 0.57 (0.09) -0.79 (-0.12)
× Fair 0.14 (0.02) -0.85 (-0.15)
× Very good -1.92 (-0.30) -1.37 (-0.22)
× Excellent 32.52 (2.58) 31.95 (2.53)
Vigorous physical activity 15.10 (4.22) 10.49 (2.91)
× Poor 6.14 (0.68) 2.00 (0.22)
× Fair 10.06 (1.68) 9.50 (1.57)
× Very good 4.85 (0.85) 7.68 (1.35)
× Excellent 19.54 (1.82) 22.83 (2.13)
Smoking -17.95 (-3.15) -18.38 (-3.16)
× Poor 4.88 (0.54) 3.37 (0.36)
× Fair 6.45 (0.80) 2.90 (0.36)
× Very good 6.96 (0.77) 6.88 (0.76)
× Excellent -29.06 (-1.50) -28.96 (-1.52)
Doctor-diagnosed health problems:
High blood pressure -11.51 (-5.27)
Diabetes -19.24 (-7.04)
Cancer -15.66 (-5.40)
Lung disease -26.41 (-7.93)
Heart problems -16.49 (-7.14)
Stroke -8.73 (-2.63)
Psychiatric problems -11.99 (-4.28)
Arthritis -12.10 (-5.17)
Some diﬃculty with activities of daily living:
Bathing -14.93 (-4.24)
Dressing -12.25 (-3.79)
Eating -28.51 (-5.68)
Cut points:
Poor -2.06 (-19.49) -2.26 (-20.45)
Fair -1.45 (-13.92) -1.63 (-15.00)
Good -0.62 (-5.94) -0.77 (-7.13)
Very good 0.39 (3.79) 0.26 (2.41)
Excellent 1.63 (15.15) 1.51 (13.53)
Wald test on health care utilization 403.99 (0.00) 244.16 (0.00)
Observations 13,540 13,423
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Table 3: Estimation of the Portfolio Share in Risky Assets, Annuities, and Housing
The table reports estimates of a censored regression model for the percentage of tangible
wealth in each of three asset classes. Tangible wealth is the sum of the asset value of bonds,
risky assets, annuities, and housing. Explanatory variables include cohort dummies, health
status, age, tangible wealth, and their interaction with health status. The table reports
the estimated elasticities at the mean of the explanatory variables with heteroskedasticity-
robust t-statistics in parentheses. The sample consists of retired females in the HRS, born
1891–1940 and aged 65 and older.
Explanatory Variable Risky Assets Annuities Housing
Birth cohort:
1891–1900 -3.46 (-18.13) 21.73 (10.56) -15.41 (-8.42)
1901–1910 -3.27 (-15.95) 8.93 (8.31) -4.62 (-3.86)
1911–1920 -2.37 (-8.43) 5.37 (6.93) -1.33 (-1.61)
1921–1930 -0.34 (-1.49) 2.31 (3.81) 1.37 (2.19)
Health status:
Poor -1.40 (-2.43) 1.66 (1.37) 0.55 (0.37)
Fair -1.66 (-4.77) 2.17 (2.20) -0.38 (-0.38)
Very good 0.62 (1.66) -1.53 (-1.55) 1.11 (1.11)
Excellent 0.67 (1.22) -5.68 (-2.72) 5.08 (2.52)
(Age− 65)/10 1.32 (5.51) -11.70 (-20.73) 1.70 (2.62)
× Poor -0.13 (-0.28) 0.66 (0.83) -0.19 (-0.18)
× Fair 0.74 (2.44) -0.78 (-1.20) 0.42 (0.56)
× Very good -0.11 (-0.43) 0.70 (1.04) -0.81 (-1.08)
× Excellent -0.17 (-0.47) 2.20 (1.93) -1.31 (-1.10)
Tangible wealth 6.32 (33.42) -23.36 (-35.26) 12.00 (26.29)
× Poor 0.88 (2.22) -1.26 (-1.07) 3.83 (3.43)
× Fair 0.61 (2.14) -0.95 (-0.92) 1.40 (1.71)
× Very good -0.45 (-1.81) 1.01 (1.20) -2.58 (-3.73)
× Excellent -0.85 (-2.37) 4.50 (2.25) -5.46 (-4.20)
Observations 20,635 20,635 20,635
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Table 4: Parameters in the Benchmark Model
The table summarizes the parameters used to calibrate the benchmark model. The model
is solved at a two-year frequency to match the frequency of interviews in the HRS. The
parameter values are reported in annualized units.
Parameter Symbol Value
Preferences:
Subjective discount factor β 0.96
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ 0.7
Relative risk aversion γ 8
Utility weight on housing φ 0.4
Utility weight on health α 0.3
Elasticity of substitution between health and non-health consumption ρ 0.7
Strength of the bequest motive u 0.2
Asset returns:
Bond return R1 − 1 2.5%
Average risky-asset return R2 − 1 6.5%
Standard deviation of risky-asset return σ2 18%
Average annuity return R3 − 1 1.5%
Housing:
Depreciation rate δ 1.14%
Average housing return RD − 1 0.4%
Standard deviation of housing return σD 3.5%
Borrowing limit λ 20%
Health:
Growth rate of the relative price of health goods and services q 1.9%
Average of log health μH −12
Standard deviation of log health σH 1
Returns to scale on health investment ψ 0.12
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Table 5: Health Expenditure by Age and Health Status
Panel A reports the out-of-pocket health expenditure as a percentage of annuity income for
retired females in the HRS, born 1931–1940 and at the average tangible wealth conditional
on cohort and age. The tabulation uses predicted values from a regression model in which
the explanatory variables are cohort dummies, health status, age, tangible wealth, and their
interaction with health status. Panel B reports the out-of-pocket health expenditure averaged
over simulated retirees in the benchmark model. The parameters of the model are those
reported in Table 4.
Health Status Age
65–66 71–72 77-78 83–84 89–90
Panel A: HRS Data (% of Annuity Income)
Poor 16 20 25 31 39
Fair 12 16 20 25 31
Good 8 11 14 19 25
Very good 6 8 11 14 19
Excellent 5 6 8 10 13
Panel B: Benchmark Model (% of Annuity Income)
Poor 21 22 26 31 35
Fair 16 18 21 25 27
Good 12 14 16 19 19
Very good 7 9 9 11 11
Excellent 6 6 5 7 7
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Table 6: Distribution of Health by Age
Panel A reports the distribution of health for retired females in the HRS, born 1931–1940 and
at the average tangible wealth conditional on cohort and age. The tabulation uses predicted
values from an ordered probit model in which the explanatory variables are cohort dummies,
age, and tangible wealth. Panel B reports the distribution of health for simulated retirees
in the benchmark model. The parameters of the model are those reported in Table 4.
Health Status Age
65–66 71–72 77-78 83–84 89–90
Panel A: HRS Data (% of Retirees)
Poor 10 11 12 13 14
Fair 24 25 26 26 27
Good 33 33 33 33 33
Very good 25 24 23 22 21
Excellent 8 7 7 6 5
Panel B: Benchmark Model (% of Retirees)
Poor 10 8 8 9 11
Fair 24 15 17 20 23
Good 33 32 33 35 36
Very good 25 33 31 29 26
Excellent 8 13 10 7 5
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Table 7: Portfolio Share in Bonds by Age and Health Status
Panel A reports the percentage of tangible wealth in bonds for retired females in the HRS,
born 1931–1940 and at the average tangible wealth conditional on cohort and age. The
tabulation uses predicted values from the censored regression model in Table 3. Panel B
reports the percentage of tangible wealth in bonds averaged over simulated retirees in the
benchmark model. The parameters of the model are those reported in Table 4.
Health Status Age
65–66 71–72 77-78 83–84 89–90
Panel A: HRS Data (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 3 7 12 17 22
Fair 3 8 13 17 21
Good 3 8 13 18 22
Very good 3 8 13 18 22
Excellent 3 7 12 16 20
Panel B: Benchmark Model (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 8 9 13 18 21
Fair 5 8 12 17 21
Good 4 7 11 16 20
Very good 2 6 11 16 20
Excellent 3 5 11 17 20
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Table 8: Portfolio Share in Risky Assets by Age and Health Status
Panel A reports the percentage of tangible wealth in risky assets for retired females in
the HRS, born 1931–1940 and at the average tangible wealth conditional on cohort and age.
The tabulation uses predicted values from the censored regression model in Table 3. Panel B
reports the percentage of tangible wealth in risky assets averaged over simulated retirees in
the benchmark model. The parameters of the model are those reported in Table 4.
Health Status Age
65–66 71–72 77-78 83–84 89–90
Panel A: HRS Data (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 3 3 4 5 6
Fair 3 4 5 7 9
Good 4 5 6 8 9
Very good 5 6 7 8 10
Excellent 5 6 7 8 10
Panel B: Benchmark Model (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 3 7 8 9 9
Fair 5 7 8 9 9
Good 6 7 8 9 10
Very good 7 7 8 9 10
Excellent 7 8 8 9 9
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Table 9: Portfolio Share in Annuities by Age and Health Status
Panel A reports the percentage of tangible wealth in annuities for retired females in the
HRS, born 1931–1940 and at the average tangible wealth conditional on cohort and age.
The tabulation uses predicted values from the censored regression model in Table 3. Panel B
reports the percentage of tangible wealth in annuities averaged over simulated retirees in the
benchmark model. The parameters of the model are those reported in Table 4.
Health Status Age
65–66 71–72 77-78 83–84 89–90
Panel A: HRS Data (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 73 66 60 53 46
Fair 73 66 58 51 43
Good 71 64 57 50 43
Very good 70 63 57 50 43
Excellent 66 60 54 48 43
Panel B: Benchmark Model (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 73 62 54 47 43
Fair 73 62 54 47 42
Good 71 62 54 46 42
Very good 70 62 54 46 42
Excellent 66 62 54 47 42
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Table 10: Portfolio Share in Housing by Age and Health Status
Panel A reports the percentage of tangible wealth in housing for retired females in the HRS,
born 1931–1940 and at the average tangible wealth conditional on cohort and age. The
tabulation uses predicted values from the censored regression model in Table 3. Panel B
reports the percentage of tangible wealth in housing averaged over simulated retirees in the
benchmark model. The parameters of the model are those reported in Table 4.
Health Status Age
65–66 71–72 77-78 83–84 89–90
Panel A: HRS Data (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 22 23 24 25 26
Fair 21 22 24 25 26
Good 22 23 24 25 26
Very good 23 23 24 24 25
Excellent 27 27 27 27 28
Panel B: Benchmark Model (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 16 22 25 27 26
Fair 18 23 26 27 27
Good 20 24 27 28 28
Very good 22 25 27 29 29
Excellent 25 25 27 28 28
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Table 11: Health Expenditure and Asset Allocation in the Model with an Annuity Market
Panel A reports the out-of-pocket health expenditure as a percentage of annuity income
averaged over simulated retirees in the model with an annuity market. Panels B through E
report the percentage of tangible wealth in bonds, risky assets, annuities, and housing. The
parameters of the model are those reported in Table 4.
Health Status Age
65–66 71–72 77-78 83–84 89–90
Panel A: Health Expenditure (% of Annuity Income)
Poor 16 17 19 22 21
Fair 10 12 14 16 15
Good 6 8 9 12 12
Very good 4 5 6 7 9
Excellent 3 4 5 5 9
Panel B: Bonds (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 0 0 0 -1 -1
Fair 0 0 0 -1 -1
Good 0 0 0 -1 -1
Very good 0 0 0 -1 -1
Excellent 0 0 -1 -1 -1
Panel C: Risky Assets (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 0 0 0 0 0
Fair 0 0 0 0 0
Good 0 0 0 0 0
Very good 0 0 0 0 0
Excellent 0 0 0 0 0
Panel D: Annuities (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 96 97 97 97 97
Fair 97 97 97 97 97
Good 97 97 97 97 97
Very good 96 97 97 97 97
Excellent 96 96 96 96 96
Panel E: Housing (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 4 4 4 3 3
Fair 4 4 4 4 4
Good 4 3 3 3 3
Very good 4 4 4 4 4
Excellent 4 5 5 5 5
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Table 12: Estimation of the Out-of-Pocket Expenditure Share
The table reports estimates of a censored regression model for the percentage of total health
expenditure that is paid out-of-pocket. Health expenditure includes the cost of hospitals,
nursing homes, doctor visits, dentist visits, outpatient surgery, prescription drugs, home
health care, and special facilities. Explanatory variables include cohort dummies, health
status, age, tangible wealth, and their interaction with health status. The table reports
the estimated elasticities at the mean of the explanatory variables with heteroskedasticity-
robust t-statistics in parentheses. The sample consists of retired females in the HRS, born
1891–1940 and aged 65 and older.
Explanatory Variable Elasticity
Birth cohort:
1891–1900 -27.69 (-10.10)
1901–1910 -17.73 (-8.09)
1911–1920 -12.60 (-7.27)
1921–1930 -5.37 (-4.08)
Health status:
Poor -10.59 (-4.88)
Fair -3.71 (-1.96)
Very good 3.92 (1.98)
Excellent -3.34 (-1.23)
(Age− 65)/10 6.10 (4.90)
× Poor 4.09 (2.74)
× Fair 1.49 (1.17)
× Very good -1.66 (-1.25)
× Excellent -0.21 (-0.11)
Tangible wealth 5.59 (7.15)
× Poor 0.66 (0.50)
× Fair 3.70 (3.24)
× Very good 0.87 (0.74)
× Excellent 0.28 (0.18)
Observations 14,088
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Figure 1: Health Transition Probabilities in the Absence of Health Expenditure
The ﬁgure shows the health transition probabilities in the absence of health expenditure for
retired females in the HRS, born 1931–1940 and at the average tangible wealth conditional
on cohort and age. The predicted probabilities are based on the ordered probit model in
column (1) of Table 2. 50
